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 ABSTRACT 
 
Modelling the volume traded by illegal inside traders is a fairly new area of research. 
Previous research into insider trading has focused not a comprehensive study on the 
determinants of volume, but empirical and theoretical work has touched the area. This 
thesis will aim to consolidate the scattered literature and model the volume traded by 
someone who has made the decision to trade on that information (i.e. we are not 
concerned so much with the ‘to trade or not to trade question’ but rather the how 
much question). The literature assists in finding factors that may cause high volumes 
of inside trading under the framework of the utility theory of insider trading. These 
factors are tested on SEC data on prosecuted insider trades for trades executed 
between 31 May 1994 and 17 October 2007 to find the material determinants of 
illegal insider trading volumes on the American option markets. 
 
Three determinants examined perform as expected: the performance of the underlying 
stock is negatively correlated with insider trading volumes on the option market, the 
act of spreading trades over multiple days increases the insider volume traded and the 
option liquidity on the day/s of the insider trade/s is positively correlation with insider 
trading volumes. Two determinants perform contrary to what is expected: higher 
levels of normal trading liquidity reduce insider trading volume and larger amounts of 
insider trading volume occur after more stringent insider trading regulations are put in 
place on 23 October 2000. The other factors are insignificant, not influencing the 
amount of insider trading volume and include: the amount of profit per option, the 
volume in the underlying stock, the number of relationships to other traders, working 
for a scrutinised firm and the type of information announcement. Finally, through 
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 robustness testing it is indeterminable whether insider trades on the option markets 
differ significantly from the average trade, however results are presented, which may 
be usefully interpreted given future research efforts. 
 
Since many of the null and unexpected results can be adequately explained, the thesis 
concludes with the proposition that there is not enough evidence to either prove or 
disprove the utility theory of insider trading. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The insider trading we refer to throughout this thesis is of the illegal kind, that is any 
individual who trades shares based on material non-public information in violation of 
some duty of trust. As opposed to simply trading by corporate insiders such as 
officers, key employees, directors, and large shareholders who may legally trade in a 
way that does not take advantage of non-public information. 
 
Illegal insider trading poses adverse selection costs upon dealers thereby increasing 
the cost of trading for all market participants. This has been postulated in theory by 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Glosten (1989); Easley and O’Hara (1992); Madhavan 
(2000); Kavajecz (1998) and Dupont (2000) and empirically verified by Fishe and 
Robe (2004) who show that Dupont’s (2000) model’s predictions are most consistent 
with their findings. The other major documented reason against illegal insider trading 
is, as King and Roell (1988) point out situations where it is clearly desirable to 
prevent the dissemination of information such as a company planning a takeover bid 
trying to accumulate a pre-bid stake to recoup the costs associated with making the 
bid. It is argued here that there is theft from rightful owner of the information. They 
also agree with the adverse selection costs argument from wider bid-ask spreads being 
posed on other investors and since the cost is imposed upon the numerous uninformed 
traders in the form of high bid ask spreads, insider trading should naturally be made 
criminal offence, since no individual can reasonably make a civil claim. The higher 
the volume illegally traded by insiders, the higher both the adverse selection costs are 
and the costs imposed upon the rightful owner of the information. 
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 The future use of the research will be primarily regulatory. Investigations into insider 
trading are undertaken at the NYSE by a markets supervision trading unit which 
monitors company announcements (Stock Watch) and reviews trading in the stock 
and any derivatives prior to announcement. If it is possible to predict occurrences of 
insider trading by monitoring volume then limited investigation resources will be 
utilized more efficiently (This is where volume may be of relevance in the detection 
process since inside traders may be detectable via the volume traded or relative 
volume traded). De Marzo et al. (1998) model that investigations of insider trading 
activity are costly and therefore regulators should focus on the most effective 
enforcement mechanism. If a large and detectable portion of trading in the options 
market is driven by insiders, then it may be optimal for regulators to expend relatively 
more monitoring efforts on the options market. Alternatively, the underlying factors 
that cause high volumes of trading can be monitored so resources may be allocated to 
the areas where largest volumes of inside trades are predicted, since these trades are 
the most detrimental to the integrity of the markets. It is the search for these 
underlying factors that form the foundation of this thesis 
 
The objective of this study is to find the determinants of insider trading volumes on 
the various American option markets. To achieve this end the trades and details of 
successfully prosecuted illegal insider trades from the SEC case files are analysed. 
Specifically a model developed by Wong and Frino (2008) grounded in utility theory 
is modified to suit the data and market explored in this thesis. The literature is 
examined for possible variables to explore and fit into the model. After transforming 
the variables to fit into the model they assessed for normality and are run through a 
regression. Five regressions are performed in an attempt to balance preserving 
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 observations with exploring all the independent variables. This also has the desirable 
effect of increasing the robustness of the results. The effect of a key regulatory change 
to insider trading law on 23 October 2000 is also examined in detail. A further test is 
then performed using a novel approach to distinguish insider trades from average 
trades as ultimately this distinction will assist the regulator who may decide to 
earmark trades of a certain size for more thorough investigation. 
 
Rules against insider trading on material non-public information exist in most 
jurisdictions around the world, though the details and the efforts to enforce them vary 
considerably. The United States is generally viewed as having the strictest laws 
against illegal insider trading, and makes the most serious efforts to enforce them.1 
The SEC case file initially had 3182 observations before culling to the 108 
observations used in this study. No other jurisdiction in the world would have enough 
observations for a meaningful study, so data availability is the key driver for the 
exploration of the American option markets in this thesis. 
 
One draft study by Wong and Frino (2008) looks at the determinants of insider trading 
volumes in the stock market. The results in this thesis complement Wong and Frino 
(2008), since the option market is fundamentally different in terms of leverage, 
liquidity and regulatory scrutiny. The results in this thesis are thus expected to be 
distinct and are different from Wong and Frino’s (2008) results, thus exploring an 
area virtually untouched by the literature. 
 
                                                 
1 "Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement" by John C. Coffee, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review (December 2007) 
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 The option market provides a laboratory for investigating the reward and risk 
associated with additional trading profit per share. Because of the additional leverage 
offered by options, there is a significant distinction between the profit per option 
made and the increase in the underlying share price where as in the share market the 
share price increase and profit per share are virtually identical. Since profit per option 
represents reward and the increase in the underlying share price represents cost our 
analysis allows separate treatment of each variable. Wong and Frino (2008) had to use 
one variable for profit per share so their results do not untangle the effect of reward 
and risk. Wong and Frino (2008) obtain a positive coefficient for this variable 
suggesting that the reward outweighs the risk, but disentanglement in this study 
allows a deeper analysis of the effect of each. It is found in this study that profit per 
option is insignificant in driving insider trading volumes, while the absolute 
underlying share price is negatively related to insider trading volumes on the option 
market. 
 
This thesis also investigates the effect of a regulatory change that was ignored by 
Wong and Frino (2008).2 Our unexpected result suggests a change in investor attitude 
that overcomes the higher probability of prosecution suggested by the change in 
insider trading legislation. 
 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines previous 
literature, theory and institutional detail. Chapter 3 draws on previous literature and 
builds up to variable selection and hypothesis development. Chapter 4 outlines the 
data and the institutional detail. Chapter 5 describes the research methodology 
                                                 
2 However, credit does go to Brad Wong for suggesting the existence of the regulatory change even 
though it was not explored in the latest draft of his 2008 paper 
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 employed in this study. Chapter 6 presents the results. Chapter 7 presents additional 
test for robustness employed and Chapter 8 provides conclusions with suggestions for 
possible areas of future research. 
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 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature (2.1), institutional background of 
the regulatory body responsible for monitoring insider trading (2.2) and a summary of 
the utility theory applied to insider trading decision making (2.3). 
 
2.1. Literature Review 
 
Only one draft study has explored determinants of insider trading volume. Wong et al. 
(2008) examine the factors that influence the magnitude of stock traded by illegal 
insiders. They find that insiders trade larger volumes when normal trading volume in 
the security is greater, the information is more valuable (i.e. a higher price change 
prior to announcement), and the security is listed in a market without a specialist 
market maker. Insiders trade lower volumes as the information announcement 
approaches, if the trader is a firm or related firm insider and when the expected 
penalty is higher. These results are extended to the option market using data deleted 
from Wong et al’s (2008) study. 
 
One of the first studies to examine insider trading before SEC prosecution data was 
available is Keown and Pinkerton (1981). By examining aggregate volumes they 
confirmed statistically that insider trading is rampant prior to takeover 
announcements. Leakage of inside information was held to have occurred at a 
significant level at up to 12 trading days prior to the first public announcement of a 
proposed merger. 
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 The existing published theoretical literature does assist us in our task by suggesting 
explanatory variables that may be relevant to insider trading volumes. De Marzo, 
Fishman and Hagerty (1998) develop a model describing the theoretical optimal 
enforcement of insider trading regulations that maximizes investors’ welfare. Since 
this policy entails investigations following large trading volumes, large price 
movements and/or unexpected announcements (as opposed to routine earnings 
announcements) investors are more likely to trade most aggressively on news with an 
intermediate price impact while refraining from trading on extreme news. Kyle (1985) 
models legal insider trading without considering the possibility of sanctions and 
suggests that insiders will trade strategically by breaking up their trades and trading 
slowly over a longer information horizon, while trading aggressively on shorter 
information horizons. Under Kyle’s (1985) model the more extreme the news the 
more volume an insider will trade since there are no penalties to discourage trading on 
extreme news. The model also suggests a linear relationship between insider volume 
traded and total liquidity available. Seyhun’s (1992) model in Appendix A predicts 
that insiders trade greater volumes when there is a greater expected increase in the 
share price and that increases in sanctions unambiguously decrease volumes. He also 
predicts that greater penalties will reduce the positive relationship between 
information and volume. 
 
Empirical studies have also examined illegal insider trades noting various 
characteristics. Cornell and Sirri (1992) found in their case study that 78.2% of the 
insider trades are of medium size, compared with only 38.4% of all trades in the same 
stock. Garfinkel and Nimelandran (2003) verify Barclay and Warner’s (1993) 
contention that stealth (medium-sized) trades are more likely to be based on private 
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 information. They found that when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities 
(500-9,999 shares) there are large changes in proportional effective spreads. 
Meulbroek (1992) used SEC illegal insider trading data to show that the abnormal 
return on an insider trading day averages 3% and that almost half of the pre-
announcement Not only do they find that volume is unusually high on an insider 
trading day but that the insider trading constitutes most of the unusual volume on an 
insider trading day. The heightened sensitivity of price to volume of insider trading 
days indicates that trade-specific characteristics, such as trade size, number of trades, 
trade direction as well as total volume traded by insiders, lead to the incorporation of 
the inside information into price.  
 
Jayaramann, Frye and Sabherwal (2001) show empirically that there is a significant 
increase in the trading activity of call and put options for companies involved in a 
takeover prior to the rumour of an acquisition or merger. The increased trading 
suggests that there is a significant level of informed trading in the options market 
prior to announcements and since this abnormal trading leads the equities market; 
their finding supports the hypothesis that the option market play an important role in 
price discovery. They also find evidence of increased volume and open interest prior 
to the rumour of a merger and acquisition suggesting that there is information in both 
trading volume and open interest. Meulbroek (1992) examining insider trades 
prosecuted by the SEC found that among all insider trading episodes where exchange-
traded options existed, inside traders used options in 50% of these episodes. Cao, 
Chen and Griffin (2005) show that the options market can be particularly informative 
ahead of extreme material events and even displace the stock market as the primary 
market for price discovery. An investigation of determinants of insider volume in the 
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 option market is warranted because it is so pervasive and displaces the equities market 
as the source of price discovery prior to material announcements. 
 
There are advantages to trading in the options market as opposed to the stock market 
for an informed trader. Black (1975) argues that the higher leverage available in the 
options market might motivate informed traders to trade options rather than stocks. 
Cox and Rubinstein (1985) argue that cost of trading in options is often lower than the 
cost of making a series of trades to replicate the payoffs such options offer. 
Verrecchia (1987) further show that trading in options can mitigate restrictions on 
short sales (such as the no up tick rule). Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas’ (1998) model 
shows that informed traders often prefer the options market because it offers a higher 
expected payoff and may allow them to hide their trades. They also suggest that the 
thinness in options relative to underlying equities make trades in the options market 
relatively more transparent. In their model very low liquidity in the options market 
will cause inside traders to prefer trading using stocks. The level of informed trading 
vis-à-vis equity market is an empirical question that we can shed light upon in this 
paper through comparison with Wong et al’s (2008) results. The literature has show 
that there are good reasons for insider trading on the options market and we aim to 
examine the determinants of volume on this market to fill the gap the literature has 
left in determinants of volume both in general and in the option market. 
 
2.2.  Institutional Background 
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 It is imperative to examine how enforcement happens in practise as this will shed light 
on the kinds of variables that will increase the probability of being caught. It could 
also show us the cause of sample selection bias. 
 
At the NYSE, the Market Surveillance Division includes a group called Stock Watch 
who monitors trading patterns looking for abnormal movements in volumes and 
prices (especially movements which precede announcements) to report to NYSE 
investigators who further look into the matter. The NYSE investigators will then see if 
the abnormal trading patterns can be attributed to another event. If this cannot be 
done, the investigators will establish a period of review leading up to the 
announcement. For a takeover announcement they will compare the set of individuals 
who traded to a set of individuals who may have had access to non-public information 
about the takeover. The individuals may include employees of the bidder and target 
firms, investment banks and law firms. If the investigators uncover suspicious trades 
they are then passed on to the SEC, who can then take the matter to court. 
 
Meulbroek (1992) finds that 31% of SEC investigations are from exchange referrals, 
41% from public complaints (such as tips from employees and ex-spouses) and the 
remaining 28% come from various other sources including broker referrals and other 
SEC cases. 
 
2.3.  Model 
 
The utility theory of crime and punishment by Becker (1968) provides a framework 
with which to predict the optimal volume traded by insiders. If the expected utility 
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 from committing the crime exceeds the expected costs then a crime is committed. 
Given that volume affects the profit, the size of the penalty as well as the probability 
of being caught, there should be some optimal volume which maximises the utility of 
investors who trade on inside information. 
 
Wong et al. (2008) develop a theory using the basic premise of Becker (1968) for 
illegal inside traders on the equity market 
 
They assume a risk-neutral investor utility maximising investor 
 
cVVPV )(−= φπ  
 
Where   φ  = profit per option (perceived value of the information) 
V = volume trade by the insider 
P(V) = probability of being sanctioned for illegal trading 
C = penalty per option traded if sanctioned 
 
By further assuming that P(V) is a linear probability function depending on j 
explanatory variables Xj in addition to the volume and maximising and using logs to 
linearise the expression they arrive at. 
 
)2ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 0
1
ββφ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−−= ∑
=
k
j
jj XcV  
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 The log of the volume is a positive linear function of the log of the profit per option 
and a negative linear function of the cost per option and the log of the explanatory 
variables that determine the probability of being sanctioned. It is also shown in 
Univariate Analysis that the raw data is approximately distributed log normally 
distributed and fits well with the log transformed variables suggest by Wong et al. 
(2008) theory. 
 
The explanatory variables defined by the model can be broadly broken up into cost, 
reward and risk. These useful distinctions will be maintained during variable selection 
in the next section. 
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 3. VARIABLE SELECTION 
 
The following chapter is a discussion of the various explanatory variables used in the 
regression model. Theoretical, empirical literature as well as basic intuition is used to 
arrive at a fairly comprehensive set of factors that will affect the volumes insiders’ 
trade (3.1 – 3.10). The variables used in the regression are highlighted in bold and 
their calculation is also described. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
hypotheses formulated throughout this chapter (3.11). 
 
3.1.  Cost 
 
The cost variable need not be specified and could be incorporated into the intercept 
term as follows 
 
)2ln()ln()ln()ln( 0
1
ββφ cXV k
j
jj −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−= ∑
=
 
 
In practice, monetary penalties are set at a multiple of the profit made, so although 
there is actual penalty data which could also be incorporated, the expected penalty 
would be fairly constant across the sample. That is the court determined monetary 
penalty wouldn’t vary much between participants unless they already possessed a 
criminal record for instance which could exacerbate their penalty (in this dataset no 
one possesses a criminal record so ex-ante expectations should be fairly uniform). 
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 Other factors that need to be included in the cost variable would be any opportunity 
costs. The salary of the defendant could be a material determinant of volume as a 
prosecuted defendant is likely to lose their job. The data sample does contain a salary 
column; however most of the observations are missing so these will form part of the 
intercept term. 
 
It has been suggested in Beams et al. (2003) and Khan (2001) that self-punitive 
factors and ethics have more effect than court-imposed quantifiable punishments. 
There is also the obvious stigma associated with being prosecuted in the criminal 
courts, or even being simply a suspect for investigation. The full range of costs may 
be hard to determine since the most powerful deterrents are non-quantifiable. This is 
another reason for letting the intercept term determine the costs rather than using 
actual penalty data. Furthermore, the penalty data is incomplete so its inclusion would 
also reduce the amount of observations available for the study. 
 
The intercept term is essentially the logarithm of variable costs as well as any other 
uniform costs considered by insider trades whether quantifiable or non-quantifiable. 
This leads to the first hypothesis 
 
H1:  The intercept term will have a negative value, since this represents the 
costs 
  
3.2. Profit 
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 More extreme news resulting in larger price movements is more likely to be 
investigated under De Marzo, Fishman and Hagerty’s (1998) model. 
 
Meulbroek and Hart (1997) however find no evidence that insider traders selectively 
trade in takeovers with large premia. By examining the source of SEC investigations, 
they also find no support for the hypothesis that larger premia are more likely to lead 
to detection of illegal trading. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the illegal insider trading itself tends to create larger takeover premia rather than 
larger takeover premia causing higher levels of insider trading. 
 
They also report that the average size of the abnormal returns on days with illegal 
insider trading is positively associated with the percentage of trading volume by 
insider on those days. 
 
Under Wong et al’s (2008) model there are two conflicting hypothesis for the effect of 
profit/share. Higher percentage profit may increase the risk of being sanctioned while 
it also increases the rewards so the effect on traded volume is tangled and ambiguous. 
In our study using options we can separate the profit per option made by the insider 
from the information without suffering the severe multicollinearity problems that 
would occur if we used the share market (since percentage profit per share made by 
insider and percentage increase in share price to announcement will be correlated) 
The absolute profit per option variable see how investors value profits when balancing 
the rewards against the risk of sanctions. The percentage increase in the underlying 
stock will proxy for the risk of investigation, so that the conflicting evidence between 
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 De Marzo (1998) and Meulbroek and Hart (1997) can be resolved. This leads to the 
following two hypotheses 
 
H2a:  Profit per option is positively related to insider trading volume since 
this measures the reward for the insider 
 
H2b:  An absolute percentage increase in underlying stock price from trade 
date to announcement date is negatively related insider volume since 
this measure the risk for the insider 
 
Hypothesis 2a is tested using the variable Profit_Option. Profit is generally provided, 
but where this is unavailable the data is resurrected by matching opening and closing 
transactions (where available), finding the difference between these values and 
multiplying by insider volume to calculate the profit. The Profit_Option variable is 
calculated by dividing total profit by option volume and one is added before 
performing the log transformation. Since 14 observations have Profit_Option values 
originally between 0 and 1, if 1 is not added, these observations would have negative 
values after log transformation.3 
 
Hypothesis 2b is tested using the variable Underlying_Per. Underlying_Per is 
calculated by first collecting underlying share price at the opening of the date of trade 
one from TaqTic, and collecting the underlying share price at the closing of the date 
after the day of the announcement (so that the share price has enough time for 
information to be properly impounded). The absolute value of the difference between 
                                                 
3 The interpretation of the sign of the regression coefficient will be more clear if all observations have a 
positive value. 
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 these prices is divided by the initial price and 1 is added before a log transformation is 
performed.4 
 
3.3. Type of announcement 
 
De Marzo et al. (1998) suggest that modest trading volumes will trigger an 
investigation following a significant announcement such as a bankruptcy filing or a 
takeover offer, whereas an announcement that earnings are slightly below (or above) 
analyst’ expectations would lead to an investigation only if excessive volume were 
observed. Inside information on takeover announcements is less uncertain than 
earnings announcement information so investors would trader higher volumes with 
more confidence under this logic. 
 
In the Kyle (1985) model of insider trading an insider possessing information that 
there would be a surprising positive announcement would trade more and earn higher 
profits than under less positive news. However, De Marzo, Fishman and Hagerty 
(1998) incorporating the risk of being caught illegally inside trading suggest that 
moderately surprising news will be more profitable for investors because this will be 
far less likely to trigger an investigation. 
 
Trading volumes that trigger an investigation following the announcement of merger 
negotiations may not necessarily trigger an investigation into the announcement of a 
hostile takeover since the insider is more likely to have known about the former. An 
                                                 
4 Underlying_Per = ln( 1+−
i
fi
p
pp
) 
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 insider under De Marzo et al. (1998) model refrains from trading on news that he is 
very likely to have known in advances but will trade on news he is less likely to have 
known. 
 
Following Wong et al. (2008) earnings announcements and merger announcements 
could be kept and the other observations deleted. However, given there are fewer 
observations the information announcements may be re-categorised into expected 
announcements (routine earnings announcements) and unexpected announcements 
(mergers, failed mergers, bankruptcy etc.). This leads to the hypothesis. 
 
H3:  Profit per option is positively related to insider trading volume 
 
Hypothesis 3 is tested using the variable Information_Type. Information_Type is 
calculated by examining the type of information announcement and manually placing 
a 0 if the information was unexpected i.e. merger announcement, failed merger talks, 
bankruptcy, major deal signing, termination of licence and 1 otherwise. Trades with 1 
were routine announcements and were almost exclusively earnings announcements. 
 
 
3.4. Trading volume of security 
 
Wong et al. (2008) use the normal trading volume of the security as an explanatory 
variable under the intuition that if the inside trader’s volume is significantly large 
compared to the normal trading volume then the investigator is more likely to 
investigate those particular trades 
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In the options market the normal trading volume is somewhat complicated by the 
presence of multiple options of different strike prices and expiry dates that are very 
close substitutes for one another. It will not be appropriate to use the volume for the 
specific option traded on the day due to the presence of a large number of close 
substitutes for that specific option. The final choice of the specific liquidity measure 
balances ease of data collection with suitability. All options written on the underlying 
stock in the 30 days immediately prior to the date of the first trade of a particular 
trading package is chosen as the normal trading volume for the observation. 
 
In addition it may be more relevant to explore the total volume traded on the specific 
day of the option as a large proportion of the days trading may indicate insider trading 
and this hypothesis is consistent with the results of Meulbroek (1992) who finds that 
not only are total volumes on insider trading days are higher, but the proportion of 
insider trading on insider trading days is significantly high. All option series 
belonging to the expiry month with the highest volume on the day/s of the insider 
trade is chosen as the short term liquidity metric. 
 
Investigators may look for above average volume increases and then further 
investigate trades that are a large proportion of the days trading, so both usual volume 
and the day’s volume may be relevant in determining the probability of investigation 
and therefore sanctioning. This leads to the following two hypotheses. 
 
H4a:  Short term liquidity is positively related to insider volume 
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 H4a: Longer term liquidity is positively related to insider volume 
 
Hypothesis 4a is tested using the variable Day_Liquidity. For the short term liquidity 
measure (Day_Liquidity), the total volume of the options (of various strike prices) of 
the most liquid expiry month on the date of the insider trade (or on the day of both 
days of trading if applicable) is sourced manually from TaqTic. 
 
Hypothesis 4b is tested using the variable Prior_Liquidity. The longer term liquidity 
measure (Prior_Liquidity) is sourced by adding all options volumes from all option 
series written on the company of the particular insider trading package in the 30 days 
immediately prior to the date of the first trade of a particular trading package. 
 
3.5. Days between trade and information announcement 
 
The probability of being sanctioned may be a function of the time between the trade 
by the insider and the date of the announcement. There are two theories behind this 
hypothesis. Kyle (1985) suggests that insiders can trade larger amounts early so that 
expected profit can be maximised before the information is impounded into the price 
by other informed traders. The other is that because investigators generally set a 
window of investigation preceding the announcement the probability of sanction 
should be smaller the further the insider trades away from the information 
announcement. Wong et al. (2008) investigated this variable for insider traders on 
stock market and found a positive correlation between the number of days and the 
insider volume traded. This leads to the hypothesis. 
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 H5: The number of days between the announcement date and the trading 
package is positively related to insider volume 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 is tested using the variable Days. To calculate the Days between trade 
and information announcement when there is one trade is trivial. However, to 
calculate the days between the trade and information announcement when there are 
multiple trades on different days, the approach from Wong et al. (2008) is employed 
where the volume weighted average number of calendar days before the information 
announcement is taken. One is added to all observations before performing the log 
transformation, so that trades on announcement day may be included in the study.5 
 
3.6. Structural break 
 
On 23 October 2000 the SEC introduced Rule 10b5-1 which lowered the prosecution 
standard of proof and therefore increased the probability of conviction. They re-
defined illegal trading as anyone trading a security while in possession of material 
non-public information with respect to that security.6 Given that the probability of 
sanctioning is uniformly increased for all observations occurring after 23 October 
2000, a dummy variable is used to measure the hypothesised increase in the slope of 
                                                 
5 Days = ln(
21
2211
vv
dvdv
+
+
+1) where d1 is the number of calendar days before the information 
announcement that the insider trader performed on the first day of the trading package, d2 = d1-1, v1 is 
the volume of the first trade in the package, v2 is the volume of the second trade in the package. 
6 The rule also provided a safe harbour clause which allows insiders to trade before announcements so 
long as the trade is pre-planned according to certain criteria. The net effect of the stricter enforcement 
standard and the safe harbour clause is uncertain, however intuitively it seems that stricter enforcement 
standard dominates since the safe harbour clause merely clarifies existing common law so a perceived 
increase in the overall probability of being caught should occur after this structural change. 
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 the probability explanatory variables after the structural change. This leads to the 
hypothesis. 
 
H6: The increase in the probability of being caught after 23 October 2000 
will lead to decreased insider volumes for those observations 
 
Hypothesis 6 is tested using the variable Change. Change is dummy variable that is 
assigned one if the date of trade 1 of a particular trading package occurs after the date 
of the regulatory change (23 October 2000) and zero otherwise. 
 
3.7. Breaking up trades 
 
An investor who breaks up trades may be able to trade a higher volume. The investor 
may save on the price impact that trading a larger block would have on the market. 
There will be a temporary component as compensation for the specialist or other 
intermediary providing liquidity and a permanent component reflecting information 
revealed by the trade. Kyle (1985) suggests that a given position can be obtained with 
smaller price concessions if broken up over time. However, we measure the price 
obtained directly so the way in which the trades are broken up to achieve a price 
improvement is irrelevant. Breaking up trades may affect the results if they lead to a 
change in the probability of detection. It is hypothesised that people who break up 
trades and feed them over a number of days can trade more volume as their 
probability of being caught is diminished which differs from Wong et al. (2008) 
approach where it is ignored how trades are broken up as they assume that investors 
are optimally breaking up their orders. This leads to the hypothesis. 
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H7: Insiders trade more volume if they split their trades over more than 
one day 
 
Hypothesis 7 is tested using the variable Multiple_Days. Multiple_Days is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the trades are spread on multiple days (i.e. more than one) 
and 0 otherwise. The data only indicates the date range of the trades and not if the 
trade is executed on all days in the range or only part of the days in the range. The 
maximum date range permissible in this study is 2 days, so a Multiple_Days value of 
1 implies that the insider trades are executed over 2 days. Since it is unknown if trades 
over 3 days traded on all three days or only 2 of those days a more advanced 
treatment of this variable is not possible, thus trades of 3 or more days are deleted. 
 
3.8. Firm insiders 
 
An inside trader who is an employee of the firm or works at a firm where risk of 
investigation is high is likely to trade lower volumes. The institutional background 
indicates likely to have had access to non-public information are more likely to be 
investigated. The individuals may include employees of the bidder and target firms, 
investment banks and law firms. Wong et al. (2008) tested for the effect of being a 
firm insider on the volume they traded on the stock market and found that being a 
firm insider decreased the volume traded. This leads to the hypothesis. 
 
H8: Insiders trade more volume if they split their trades over more than 
one day 
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Hypothesis 8 is tested using the variable Firm_Insider. Firm_Insider is a dummy 
variable that is calculated from the information of the description and occupation 
columns of the original dataset. A one is assigned to Firm_Insider if the insider trader 
is employed by the firm whose securities are being insider traded, and thus would be 
shortlisted as a potential target for investigation by investigators. A one is also 
assigned to Firm_Insider if the trader is exposed to first hand information on a firm 
that is related to the insider trading firm. After this treatment traders that are not 
working at the principle or related firm are assigned a 0 and these traders are 
generally tipped by friends or relatives that worked at the suspicious firms, or came 
upon the information by accident. 
 
3.9. Relationships 
 
Groups of insider traders may have a higher likelihood of being caught then the sum 
of the individuals because of SEC investigators following leads leading to family 
members or fellow employees who have also traded. Meulbroek (1992) found that 
28% of SEC investigations come from sources including other SEC cases, so a 
relationship with another prosecuted individual will likely increase the probability of 
being sanctioned. Given the way investigations are conducted it is hypothesised that a 
higher number of related people prosecuted in an investigation would increase the 
probability of sanctioning. In addition one would expect that the SEC is more likely to 
go to the expense of building a case to prosecute 25 people than just 1. This leads to 
the hypothesis. 
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 H9: There is a negative correlation between the number of relationships 
with other traders and the amount of volume traded 
 
Hypothesis 9 is tested using the variable Relationships. Relationships is taken from 
a column, ‘people prosecuted no.’ in the original data that describes the number of 
people prosecuted or involved with the insider trading. The variable then undergoes a 
log transformation. 
 
3.10. Underlying equity volume 
 
There is an argument that underlying equity volume may affect the probability of 
being caught. Higher equity volumes may stimulate investigation attention into the 
options market. Alternatively, higher equity volumes may draw attention away from 
the option market. It is an exploratory piece of research to include this as an 
explanatory variable affecting the probability of sanctions being imposed. This leads 
to the hypothesis 
 
H10: Underlying equity volume is unrelated to insider volume 
 
Hypothesis 10 is tested using the variable Underlying_Vol. Underlying_Vol is 
manually sourced from TaqTic, as the volume on the underlying stock on the date of 
first trade of the trading package. 
 
3.11.  Summary of hypotheses 
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 Based on the discussion above, the following hypotheses will be test in this thesis. 
 
H1:  The intercept term will have a negative value, since this represents the 
costs 
 
H2a:  Profit per option is positively related to insider trading volume since 
this measures the reward for the insider 
 
H2b:  An absolute percentage increase in underlying stock price from trade 
date to announcement date is negatively related insider volume since 
this measure the risk for the insider 
 
H3:  Profit per option is positively related to insider trading volume 
 
H4a:  Short term liquidity is positively related to insider volume 
 
H4a: Longer term liquidity is positively related to insider volume 
 
H5: The number of days between the announcement date and the trading 
package is positively related to insider volume 
 
H6: The increase in the probability of being caught after 23 October 2000 
will lead to decreased insider volumes for those observations 
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 H7: Insiders trade more volume if they split their trades over more than 
one day 
 
H8: Insiders trade more volume if they split their trades over more than 
one day 
 
H9: There is a negative correlation between the number of relationships 
with other traders and the amount of volume traded 
 
H10: Underlying equity volume is unrelated to insider volume 
 
 
There is also one further hypothesis that relates to the addition robustness the 
additional robustness test performed in Chapter 6 that we will state here for 
convenience. 
 
H11:  Illegal inside traders trade higher volumes compared to the average 
investor 
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 4. DATA 
This chapter provides an overview of the dataset used, the filtering process and 
descriptive statistics (4.1). The distributions of each of the variables used is assessed 
for lognormality (4.2) and a univariate analysis is performed surrounding the 
regulatory change on 23 October 2000 (4.3) 
 
4.1. Description of dataset 
 
The inside trading data is drawn from litigation reports made available on the SEC 
website (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml) every time the SEC formally 
brings an action against an individual. For a full list of the columns of the dataset refer 
to appendix A7. The date range of the put/call option trades covers 31 May 1994 to 17 
October 2007 for cases filed between 31 October 1995 and 29 October 2007. After 
the trimming procedure described below the data covers trades between 24 October 
1996 and 23 February 2007 for cases filed between 11 June 1998 and 11 May 2007. It 
can be seen from these date ranges that the gap between a trade and the court case 
becomes significantly reduced for the later years. 
 
Since the litigation reports are not standardised, missing row data in a relevant column 
from which an explanatory variable is extracted renders the entire observation useless. 
This study is faced with a trade-off between exploring the entire range of explanatory 
variables and preserving enough observations to produce a statistically significant 
                                                 
7 In bold are relevant columns used to calculate explanatory variables, other columns are redundant for 
the purposes of this study 
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 result.8 Many data columns that are required are not explicitly in the original data set 
and are either calculated from the existing data or sourced manually from the TaqTic 
database. This data transformation process is described in Variable Selection under 
Chapter 3. 
 
The dataset initially has 3812 raw observations in total. After eliminating observations 
that are not either put or call options, the number of raw observations9 is 495. After 
consolidating some of the rows into trading packages10 and removing closing 
transactions (i.e. the sale of a stock after the announcement date that someone has 
bought before the announcement date), the number of actual observations is further 
reduced. Any observations without insider volume are deleted, any observations 
where underlying stock or option liquidity could not be sourced are also deleted, any 
observations with negative profit are deleted (since the insiders traders profit 
expectations should always be positive) and finally any observations spread over 
more than 2 trading days are deleted11. This results in a dataset of 108 trading 
packages. Descriptive statistics of the 108 observations are given in Table I below. 
Firm_Insider is intentionally left out in the table to boost the number of observation 
since data was missing for this variable. 
 
Table I – Descriptive Statistics 
 
                                                 
8 Variables deemed fundamental to the model that are missing are immediately deleted as described 
above. 
9 A raw observation is defined as a row in the original dataset as received 
10 A trading package is defined as one set of trades performed by a particular person for a particular 
announcement. There are a few data points where the same person, trading for the same company has 
traded prior to more than one announcement and therefore these have been classified as distinct trading 
packages. 
11 With trades executed over more than three days it can not be safely assumed which of those days the 
insider has traded on, since this information is unavailable, so the dataset was restricted to trading 
conducted over two days or less. 
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 This table provides the mean, median, maximum and minimum values of the pre log 
transformation variables (except Firm_Insider) for the sample of trading packages. 
 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Days 5.31 2 92 0 
Profit_Option $11.71 $5.35 $236.04 $0.00 
Day_Liquidity 2532.5 534.5 39113 16 
Prior_Liquidity 23332.1 4076.5 262364 156 
Multiple_Days 0.3148 0 1 0 
Information_Type 0.2870 0 1 0 
Underlying_Per 1.3538 1.2654 3.3055 1.0010 
Underlying_Vol 2971330 1268967 16028593 15500 
Change 0.6389 1 1 0 
Relationships 4.6019 3 19 0 
Volume 389.2 134.5 6700 3 
 
The mean of the dummy variables included above are of interest and represent 
meaningful percentages of the data. Of the 108 observations, 31.48% of them are 
trades executed over two days, 23.70% of them are routine earnings announcements 
and 63.89% of them are trades occurring between 23 October 2000 and 23 February 
2007. Naturally, 68.52% of the observations occur over a single day, 76.3% 
unexpected announcements including merger announcements and 36.11% represent 
trades occurring between 24 October 1996 and 22 October 2000. The breakdown of 
the observations (prosecuted cases) by year is also given below in Figure 1 below. 
Notice how there does not seem to be any significant change in the number of 
prosecuted cases per year after the year 2000, compared with before the year 2000 
(i.e. surrounding the regulatory change on 23 October 2000). 
 
Figure 1 – Breakdown of prosecuted cases by year 
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After compiling the dataset of 108 observations, 7 more observations are removed for 
inconsistency since the value of the insider trade exceeded the total volume of option 
trading on the day of the insider trade. Ten more observations are lost as description 
and occupation data is missing to designate the Firm_Insider dummy variable, leaving 
a total of 91 observations for the first regression. These 7 observations are set aside 
however for resurrection as described in Alternate Regressions under Chapter 5.2. 
 
4.2. Logarithmic transformation 
 
The following charts are modified12 box and whisker plots of the non-dummy 
independent variables as well as dependent variable (Volume) both pre and post log 
transformation with the pre-transformed variables on the left and post-transformed 
variables on the right. All of the left hand distributions can be seen to be skewed to 
the right following a lognormal distribution and are thus prime candidates for 
                                                 
12 Brian Kelly, of Dublin, Ireland, has suggested a modified Box and Whisker chart. This version has 
two sets of error bars, one indicating the 10th and 90th percentiles, the other showing the minimum and 
maximum values. The min and max error bars, drawn here without the cross at the end. 
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 logarithmic transformation. As can be seen below after log transformation all of the 
distributions more closely approximate a normal distribution.  
 
Figure 2 - Underlying_Vol 
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Figure 3 - Relationships 
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 Figure 4 - Volume 
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Figure 5 - Days 
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Figure 6 - Underlying_Per 
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 Figure 7 - Profit_Option 
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Figure 8 - Day_Liquidity 
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Figure 9 - Prior_Liquidity 
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 4.3. Univariate analysis 
 
A univariate analysis is also conducted to better understand the increase in insider 
option volumes after the regulatory change on 23 October 2000. Such an investigation 
is warranted since the regulatory change marks a fundamental change in the way risk 
is perceived by inside traders. Two modified box and whisker plots (a ‘before’ and 
‘after’) are drawn for each the following variables: Underlying_Per, Underlying_Vol, 
Day_Liquidity, Profit_Option, Profit and Volume. The ‘before’ box plots contain the 
observations before the regulatory change on 23 October 2000 while the ‘after’ plots 
contain the observations after the regulatory change.  The box and whisker plots show 
the 5 and 95 percentile values on the extremities instead of the usual minimum and 
maximum for better visual appeal. The diamonds linked by a straight line indicate the 
means of each distribution. 
 
Figure 10 - Underlying_Vol 
0 2,000,000 4,000,000 6,000,000 8,000,000 10,000,000 12,000,000 14,000,000
Before
After
 
 
 
 44/83 
 Figure 11 - Underlying_Per 
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Figure 11 - Day_Liquidity 
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 Figure 12 - Profit_Option 
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 Figure 14 - Volume 
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Figure 14 does suggest that after the regulatory change the volumes have increased 
uniformly across the entire distribution. The dependent variable plots are interpreted 
as follows: Underlying share volume increases across the whole distribution (Figure 
10), underlying share performance decreases (i.e. value of inside information 
decreases) across the whole distribution (Figure 11), trading day option liquidity has 
increased especially across the top half of the distribution (Figure 11), profit per 
option has decreased across the entire distribution (Figure 12), while overall profit 
taking has increased across the top half of the distribution (Figure 13). 
 
An increase in underlying share volumes should encourage proportionately more 
trading in the share market at the expense of the option market. A decrease in 
underlying share performance should decrease the risk of investigation and encourage 
stronger option volumes. An increase in trading day option liquidity should encourage 
an increase in insider trading volumes. A decrease in Profit_Option should decrease 
the attractiveness of insider trading and lower volumes. The increase in overall profit 
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 taking despite a decrease in Profit_Option suggests that traders are over-compensating 
for lower Profit_Option by trading much higher volumes.  
 
The amount of interrelation of the effects on insider volumes means is it not 
discernable what the effect on observations after the regulatory change is, so the 
regression results and the coefficient on the Change dummy variable will be examined 
in further detail. 
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 5. METHOD 
 
This chapter outlines the method used. The regression equation is formulated (5.1) 
and the procedure used to balance missing data with robustness of results is described 
(5.2). 
 
5.1. Regression equation 
 
A regression is performed using the following specification on 91 observations (108 
minus 7 inconsistent observations and minus 10 observations due to the missing 
Firm_Insider variable). The regression is performed us SAS 9.1 with the raw results 
located in Appendix 2. 
εαααααββ +++++++= ∑
=
4433221100
1
0 )ln()ln( DDDDDXV
k
j
jj  
Xj represents the explanatory variables affecting the probability of sanctions being 
imposed. 
 
X1 represents Day_Liquidity 
X2 represents Prior_Liquidity 
X3 represents Days 
X4 represents Profit_Option 
X5 represents Underlying_Per 
X6 represents Relationships 
X7 represents Underlying_Vol 
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 D0 represents Firm_Insider and = 0 if information was provided by a tippee = 1 if the 
insider worked for a firm typically under scrutiny by regulators 
 
D1 represents Information_Type and = 1 if takeover/bankruptcy or other surprise 
announcement and = 0 if earnings announcement. 
 
D3 represents Multiple_Days. If a trade is made on a single day dummy = 0 and if the 
trade is spread over two days dummy = 1. 
 
D4 represents the structural Change dummy which = 0 if trade occurs before 23 
October 2000 and = 1 if trade occurs after 23 October 2000. 
 
5.2. Alternate Regressions 
 
Alternate regressions are performed in an attempt to balance more observations with 
less explanatory variables.  Since the Firm_Insider dummy variable is insignificant, it 
is removed for regression 2 (Reg2) so that 10 observations can be salvaged to boost 
the robustness of the results.  
 
The removal of the 7 inconsistent observations documented under Chapter 4.1 for 
regression 1 (Reg1) as well as for Reg2 could lead to biased coefficients because 
these observations are likely to be observations where the proportion of insider 
trading volume out of total short term liquidity is high. To resolve this issue, 
regression 3 (Reg3) is performed with the 7 observations included under the 
assumption that the insider trading volume is excluded from the TaqTic database. The 
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 observations are added back with an adjustment to the Day_Liquidity column. The 
value of the Day_Liquidity column for those 7 observations is replaced with the 
original value plus the value of the insider trade so that the value of the insider trade is 
less than the total volume available13. A fourth regression (Reg4) is then carried out 
with these additional observations on all the explanatory variables and then repeated 
without the Firm_Insider dummy variables as before to salvage more observations. 
Regressions 1 and 2 suffering from data omission bias can be compared with 
regression 3 and 4 suffering from measurement error bias to determine the severity of 
the bias in either case. 
  
Incorporating the short term liquidity measure (Day_Liquidity) serves its purpose of 
modelling the amount of variation that is due to short term liquidity availability. 
However, the insider traded volume is part of the short term liquidity, so the 
correlation between the two variables may be highly spurious.14 Given that the 
Day_Liquidity variable is highly significant in the first 4 regression, a possible 
spurious correlation warrants removal of this Day_Liquidity variable and thus the 
regression is repeated without this variable (Reg5). Removal of the Day_Liquidity for 
Reg5 also avoids the problems that the 7 inconsistent observations provided since this 
problem is caused by the Day_Liquidity variable. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 There is a risk that the correction of these values isn’t accurate and hence measurement error may be 
introduced into this particular regression 
14 In other words, the insider volume possibly drives the short term liquidity rather than the other way 
around. 
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 6. RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents, analyses and interprets the results from the various regressions 
described above in Chapter 5. 
 
6.1. Regression Output 
 
The raw regression outputs are located in Appendices 2-6 with a summary of the 
coefficients and their interpretations provided in tables II-IV below. 
 
Table II - Summary of Estimates 
Label                Reg1         Reg2         Reg3         Reg4         Reg5 
 
 
Intercept           3.44687**    3.66870***   3.03298**    2.84083**    2.35416 
Days                0.07219      0.03357      0.04981      0.03535     ‐0.11361 
Profit_Option       0.17452      0.16433      0.15099      0.19741      0.24116 
Day_Liquidity       0.59099***   0.53499***   0.65906***   0.63434***     N/A 
Prior_Liquidity    ‐0.29438***  ‐0.27208***  ‐0.40853***  ‐0.42519***  ‐0.16276* 
Multiple_Days       0.74347***   0.83880***   0.51504*     0.59722**    1.16943*** 
Information_Type   ‐0.23570     ‐0.27500     ‐0.02562     ‐0.12937     ‐0.36205 
Underlying_Per     ‐2.02999***  ‐2.00949***  ‐1.75783***  ‐1.97050***  ‐2.41246*** 
Underlying_Vol     ‐0.02668     ‐0.02359      0.04372      0.08484      0.25881** 
Change              0.54528*     0.51296**    0.59120**    0.54082**    0.71024** 
Firm_Insider        0.12402        N/A        0.13981        N/A          N/A 
Relationships      ‐0.03737     ‐0.06176     ‐0.04309     ‐0.04495     ‐0.14752 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
Given that logarithmic transformations were used, the following table has been 
compiled to give a useful indication of the percentage effects on insider volume 
caused by the dummy variables. 
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Table III - Change in Volume given change in dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Label                Reg1         Reg2         Reg3         Reg4         Reg5 
 
 
Multiple_Days       110.32%***   131.36%***    67.37%*      81.71%**    220.02%*** 
Information_Type    ‐21.00%      ‐24.04%       ‐2.53%      ‐12.14%      ‐30.38% 
Change               72.51%*      67.02%**     80.62%**     71.74%**    103.45%** 
Firm_Insider         13.20%        N/A         15.01%        N/A          N/A 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
As shown in the tables above, five variables are significant for at least the 15% level: 
Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liquidity, Multiple_Days, Underlying_Per and Change. Out of 
these, Day_Liquidity, Underlying_Per and Multiple_Days are consistent with prior 
predictions of the sign of the variable coefficient discussed in theory. 
 
6.2. Multiple Days 
 
Multiple_Days ranges from a coefficient of 0.52 (Reg3) to 1.17 (Reg5) which 
translates to an increase of 67.37% to 220.02% in the volume of a trade executed over 
multiple days compared with a trade executed over a single day. The result is highly 
economically significant considering that the Day_Liquidity variable already 
incorporates the volume on the multiple days so the result is purely a function of 
splitting the trade over multiple days.15 The result possibly shows more confidence to 
trade larger volumes if trades are spread over multiple days, if this is the case then 
why does not everybody break up their trades? The summary statistics in Table I 
indicate that only 31.48% of traders broke up their trades. Since everyone does not 
                                                 
15 In regression 5, since the Day_Liquidity variable is excluded, the correlation between Multiple_Days 
and Day_Liquidity would mean that the Multiple_Days variable incorporates the effect of splitting as 
well as the higher short term liquidity of options traded over multiple days, which would also explain 
why its value in regression 5 is significantly higher than the other 4 regressions. 
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 break up trades, this could indicate an inherent risk to trading on multiple days. It is 
possible that there is a fixed risk increase component for having trades over two days 
and perhaps a smaller sensitivity of risk to the volume component, thus leading to two 
equilibriums of optimal trades, one for a single day and one for two days. Larger 
volumes would be required for the equilibrium occurring for a two day trade to 
compensate for the additional fixed risk component. Alternatively, if trading over 
multiple days exposes the trader to a lower risk, then this still allows more trading and 
people who don’t break their trades are irrational and could trade a larger volume with 
the same risk by breaking up their trade. Suggestions are only provided and it is left 
for future research to model the possible equilibrium that the results suggest may 
exist. 
 
6.3. Underlying Performance 
 
Underlying_Per is very robust to the number of observations and model specification 
narrowly ranging from -1.76 (Reg3) to -2.41 (Reg5) in the 5 regressions. These 
coefficients represent a 1.76% to 2.41% decrease in insider volume given a 1% 
increase in underlying performance. The result is consistent with De Marzo et al. 
(1998) theory that these trades are worth the regulators time for investigation and thus 
represent a risk of being caught and sanctioned. The result on the surface is distinct 
from, but not contradictory to the result of Wong et al. (2008) who find in their study 
of insider trading determinants on the stock market that an increase in underlying 
performance leads to an increase in insider stock traded volume. Profit per option 
traded is directly measured as the reward variable, with underlying performance 
acting as a risk variable (and perhaps indirectly affecting reward through profit per 
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 option). Wong et al. (2008) naturally can not disentangle the risk and reward 
characteristics of the underlying (stock) performance variable, where as the option 
market permits this. 
 
6.4. Intercept 
 
Also of note is the highly significant positive intercept variable. Theory predicts a 
negative intercept variable since there will be an inherent cost to trading on insider 
information, both pecuniary and non pecuniary. Theory also predicts that the 
Profit_Option variable will be the major reward variable and this would have to be 
suffiently high to exceed the cost and make it beneficial for the insider to trade a 
significant amount. The results however show a fairly high and positive intercept term 
with an insignificant Profit_Option variable, implying a somewhat more uniform and 
fixed reward structure for the insider trading participants. The results can be attributed 
to actual profit data being used rather than expected profit data. Firstly, it must be 
acknowledged that the inside information used by illegal insiders in this study is not 
necessarily perfect and that there will be some range from which people will make 
their decisions. Secondly, although people are capable of estimating with reasonable 
accuracy movements in the underlying (given the highly significant Underlying Per 
variable in this study), option movements are leveraged and thus errors in insider’s 
individual predictions are exacerbated, especially in this study since virtually all 
options used by insiders are out of the money.16 Exacerbated errors in individual prior 
                                                 
16 The moneyness column in the original received dataset had a significant amount of observations 
missing, but the observations available were exclusively out of the money options. Previous studies 
such as Cao et al. (2005) and Jayaramann (2001) show sharp increases in out of the money option 
volumes in particular prior to takeover announcements so it is fairly safe to make the assumption that 
out of the money options are the tool of choice by insider traders here. 
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 expectations of profit would explain insignificant Profit Option variable and a 
significantly positive intercept term. 
 
6.5. Structural Break 
 
The results for Change contradict theory and are all at least statistically significant at 
the 15% level ranging from 0.51 (Reg2) to 0.71 (Reg5). These coefficients imply that 
after the regulatory change insider trading option volumes are between 67.02% and 
103.45% higher in the five regressions than before the regulatory change. Given 
results on the stock market, it is possible that a shift of volumes from the stock market 
to the perceivably less monitored option market could explain this result. It is also 
possible that the regulatory change is not captured at all by the Change dummy and 
that the positive coefficient is suggesting a uniform change in investor attitude 
towards risk of prosecution for trading in the option market in the latter half of the 
observations. It is argued that the change in attitude could be rational. Given the 
existence of larger day liquidity after the regulatory change as shown in the univariate 
analysis in Chapter 4.3 as well as a fairly consistent amount of prosecutions before 
and after the regulatory change as shown in Figure 1 in Chapter 4.1, it is possible that 
the risk of being prosecuted has decreased. The consistent amount of prosecutions 
could indicate the existence of fixed regulatory resources acting as a bottleneck to 
counter the effect of the tougher insider trading legislation. Higher levels of short-
term liquidity allow more insiders to operate in the option market and since only a 
fixed amount can be prosecuted a safety in numbers effect is produced decreasing 
overall risk of prosecution for a single case. Under this logic, insider traders have 
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 realised that this risk has decreased and have rationally decided to trade more as 
observed. 
 
6.6. Normal level of liquidity 
 
An unexpected result also occurs for Prior_Liquidity with statistically significant 
results ranging from -0.163 (Reg5) to -0.425 (Reg4). A 1% increase in 
Prior_Liquidity thus translates into a 0.163% to 0.425% decrease in insider volume 
traded. High liquidity in the 30 days leading up should give an inside trader 
confidence to trade a larger amount and still remain hidden from regulation. The 
surprising result can be explained by the well documented phenomenon that option 
markets lead stock markets before information announcements and exhibit large 
proportionate increases in volume due to pervasive insider trading [see: Jayaramann et 
al. (2001) and Cao et al. (2005)]. Since option markets are far smaller in volume than 
the underlying stock market, it is possible that increases in volume attract 
disproportionately larger regulatory attention than stock markets so although an 
option trader may be hidden amongst more trades, far more regulatory scrutiny is 
attracted to override this illusionary aura of safety in numbers. Under this logic larger 
prior liquidity would attract regulatory attention while larger day liquidity would hide 
the trade. 
 
6.7. Insignificant variables 
Insignificant variables include Firm_Insider, Relationships, Days, Profit_Option and 
Information_Type. It is possible that the lack of observations could be responsible for 
these null results. Wong et al. (2008) however find strong relationships for 
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 Firm_Insider and Days on the stock market. Since the option markets are relatively 
smaller, it is possible that all trades are easily picked out by regulators. An insider 
who does trade on the option market, no matter how small, virtually does not expose 
themselves to any more risk by trading more volume because is it worthwhile for 
regulators to investigate all option trades. The incentive to conceal trades becomes 
stronger on the underlying stock market and thus there is a weaker relationship 
between option volume and the explanatory variables. It is possible that this is the key 
reason for the differences between the results in Wong et al. (2008) and this thesis. 
 
6.8. Day liquidity 
 
The difference between the coefficients of the first four regressions gives confidence 
that the measurement error bias and data omission bias are not severe so as to 
undermine the robustness of these results. Particularly pleasing is the Day_Liquidity 
coefficient, which only ranges from 0.54 to 0.66. The R squared for the first four 
regressions vary from 0.4383 to 0.4786 (Appendices 2-6) . The fifth regression which 
removes the highly significant Day_Liquidity variable drops the R squared to 0.2870 
(Appendix 7). This seems to indicate that there is a likely spurious relationship 
between Volume and Day_Liquidity. However, the coefficient does suggest that a 1% 
increase in day volume is correlated with a 0.6% increase. This does validate previous 
research that insider trading volumes on the option market are typically significant 
fractions of the total trading day liquidity. 
7. ADDITIONAL TEST 
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 This chapter presents the additional robustness test in an attempt to distinguish our 
insider trading volumes from average trades. The method used is outlined (6.1) and 
the results are presented and interpreted (6.2). 
 
7.1. Method 
 
Once the parameters of the model are estimated, a robustness test is necessary to 
ensure that the above patterns observed are only representative of insider trades and 
not all trades i.e. the volumes predicted from insider traders could be consistent with 
those obtained from using a series of random traders. 
 
One particular hurdle in the dataset that prompts the use of a new and novel approach 
is that each trading package is composed of an indeterminate number of trades spread 
over single or multiple days. A standard matched sampling methodology would thus 
be ineffective since we could not find data on trading packages, only on individual 
trades. A modified artificial matched sampling methodology is thus employed in this 
study. 
 
Instead of selecting a random trade, trades in all option series of the observation in 
question are sourced from TaqTic in the month prior to the date of the first trade in 
the trading package. A simple average is taken and this value is the average trade for 
that particular observation. The average trade provides more robust results than a 
random selection, especially when dealing with a small dataset as in this study. 
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 In constructing the data for the average trader (i.e. unknown trader), the purpose is to 
assume an average trading package instead of an insider trading package in the same 
conditions that the insider traded. It is also assumed that the average trader lacks any 
form of superior information. For each of the above scenarios the dataset is copied but 
the log of the insider volume is replaced by the log of the scenario volume. The 
Underlying_Per17 and Profit_Option18 variables are replaced with a zero value.19 
Therefore this constructed dataset represents conditions at the same time as each of 
the insider trades, but usurping an uninformed average trader with zero expectations 
of profit. Each of these constructed observations is naturally matched with the 
observation from which it was derived and the major difference between this method 
and standard matched sampling methodology is the artificial construction of the 
observations. 
 
The variables for Day, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liquidity, Underlying_Vol, Change and 
Informtion_Type are kept as these variables related to the time of the trade rather the 
character of the insider trade. 
 
The variables Relationships, Firm_Insider are related to the character of the insider 
trade and are removed. Furthermore, they are insignificant in the original regression, 
so little consequence results. 
 
Observations on multiple days are filtered out since there is no data to model how 
average trades on a single day differ from average trades spread over multiple days 
                                                 
17 The expected profit would be sufficiently close to zero to warrant an this approximation for the sake 
of robustness 
18 The expected Profit_Option under uninformed assumptions will be zero 
19 In this study the Profit_Option is zeroed at one and after taking the log of one we obtain a zero value 
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 and any more guesswork would lead to meaningless results. The robustness test thus 
only looks at insider trades occurring on a single day. And as a consequence the 
Multiple_Day variable also becomes redundant. The filtering of this variable reduced 
the original number of observations to 68, and with the addition of the constructed 
average trader data, the total observations in the robustness tests is 136. 
 
A dummy variable Inside_Trade is also constructed with a value of 1 if the trade is 
one of the original insider trades and 0 if it is one of the constructed uninformed 
average trades. 
 
However, since trading packages are being dealt with in the dataset these single trades 
need to be converted into trading packages so that there is a consistency in the 
matching process. The average trades for each observation are each multiplied by 
2,3,4,5,6 and 7 before performing a log transformation, the assumption being that a 
hypothetical average trading package is split into 2,3,4,5,6,7 trades respectively. After 
reconstructing the average trades into several scenarios of packaging, seven 
robustness tests (one for each scenario) is performed. The purpose of the various 
scenarios is that there is no available research on how trades are split by the average 
trader in the option market, so we assume a variety of average splits. It is expected 
that the results are skewed heavily towards the larger numbers. Future research on 
splitting trades in the option market can assist in interpreting these type of results. The 
hypothesis for our robustness test nevertheless follows. 
 
H11:  Illegal inside traders trade higher volumes compared to the average 
investor 
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7.2. Results 
 
The raw regression outputs are located in Appendices 7-13 with a summary of the 
Insider_Trade coefficients in Table IV below. 
 
Table IV - Robustness Test Summary of Insider_Trade 
 
The following is the summary of the regression output from the seven robustness tests 
(exploring the seven different scenarios of average trades). Scenario one assumes that 
the average trade is the full trading package, scenario two assume that the average 
trade is half of the trading package, scenario three assume that the average trade is a 
third of the trading package and so on. The results are from 136 observations (68 
insider and 68 benchmark observations) with Volume regressed against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day Liquidity, Prior Liquidity, Underlying_Performance, 
Underlying_Volume, Change and Insider_Trade. Only the coefficients of the 
Insider_Trade dummy variable are presented below. 
Label                 DF      Estimate        Error     t Value   Pr > |t| 
 
 
One                    1       1.83632       0.31622      5.81***  <.0001 
Two                    1       1.14318       0.31622      3.62***  0.0004 
Three                  1       0.73771       0.31622      2.33***  0.0212 
Four                   1       0.45003       0.31622      1.42     0.1572 
Five                   1       0.22689       0.31622      0.72     0.4744 
Six                    1       0.04456       0.31622      0.14     0.8882 
Seven                  1      ‐0.10959       0.31622     ‐0.35     0.7295 
*indicates significance at the 2.5% level 
 
 
Figure 10 – Significance and scenario number plot 
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 The following is the scenario number plotted against the t statistic from the table 
above to give a visual indication of the significance of the in between integer values. 
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As documented in Table IV and Figure 10 above, the insider trades are 
distinguishable from an average trade that has been split 3 times at a 2.5% level of 
significance, 4 times at a 16% level of significance and somewhere between 3 and 4 
times at a 5% level of significance. It is difficult to arrive at a reliable conclusion 
given these results, because basic intuition can only suggest that the average trade 
would be split somewhere between 2 and 4 times and thus we can not say with 
reasonable confidence whether the insider trades exceed, go below or are at the level 
of the average trade in the option series. Although the robustness test is admittedly ad 
hoc, the null hypothesis that the insider trades are indistinguishable from the average 
trade in the stock can not be rejected. A stockbroker working in the options market 
may have a sharper intuition and may be of the opinion that the average trades are 
broken up between 1 and 3 times, in which case he or she can say with confidence 
that insiders do trade more than the average trader. Such assertions however can not 
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 be made here without sufficient evidence, so this is left as an avenue for future 
research. Even an assertion that the average trade is representative of insider trading 
behaviour would be of use to the regulators. However, the inconclusive results from 
the robustness test do not allow any reasonable inference about the level of insider 
trading compared with the average level of trading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
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 This thesis empirically analyses the determinants of insider trading volume executed 
by illegal insider traders on the various American option exchanges. The results 
indicate a highly significant and negative relationship consistent with theory between 
insider volume and performance in the underlying stock that is robust to five different 
sets of specification/observations. This suggest that traders are aware of the risks of 
regulatory scrutiny for very surprising announcements and adjust their trading 
accordingly. Insider traders also trade more if they break up their trades over multiple 
days and if there is more short term liquidity available. These three empirical results 
are the only results consistent with theory. 
 
Two variables analysed contradict theory. Higher normal levels of liquidity reduce 
insider trading volume, suggesting a counter-intuitive effect that higher liquidities on 
the option market attract disproportionately more regulatory scrutiny. Insider trading 
volumes on the option market increased after more stringent and harsher insider 
trading regulations were put in place. It is very possible that the actual level of 
prosecution risk has decrease despite apparently more stringent insider trading 
regulations being introduced after 23 October 2000. This is reflected by the 
apparently unchanged prosecutions per year and possible increase in insider trading 
during this period, so the increased volume is interpreted a rational response to a real 
reduction in risk. 
 
The amount of profit per option, the volume in the underlying stock, the number of 
relationships to other traders, working for a scrutinised firm, days to announcement, 
being a firm insider and the type of information announcement are insignificant in this 
study. The most surprising result is the profit per option which is the fundamental 
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 measurement of the reward for insider trading in theory. It is proposed that the higher 
leverage of options cause ex-ante expectation and ex-post realised insider profit to be 
further misaligned than they would otherwise be using normal stock as a trading 
instrument. This result therefore do no necessarily contradict Wong et al’s (2008) 
findings that insider trading volumes increase with profit per share on the stock 
market. The days to announcement and being a firm insider were significant in Wong 
et al’s (2008) study. The results here do not necessarily contradict these results as it is 
acknowledged that the option market is fundamentally different to the stock market. 
Trading on the option market may itself increase the risk of prosecution thus 
weakening the relationship between volume and the explanatory variables that are 
normally significant when trading on the stock market. The relationship between 
volume in the underlying stock and insider volumes is admittedly exploratory so this 
is the least surprising of the null results. 
 
The robustness test indicates that insider trades on the option markets can not be 
distinguished from the average trades on those markets. It can not also be said with 
confidence that the insider trades are similar to the average trade, largely due to that 
fact that we don’t know what the average trading package is. It is hoped that future 
research on how option traders typically break up their trades will assist in 
interpreting these results. Ultimately, clarification of this result will be of most use to 
regulators who can filter their search on the option market to volumes deemed likely 
to be driven by inside information. 
 
The sample that is used in this study is composed entirely of traders who have not 
only been caught, but have made the decision to trade. In an ideal world a dataset 
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 containing values of people possessing insider information and deciding not to trade 
would shed more light on the decision making process. The study does not rule out 
given the null and unexpected results that an entirely arbitrary process is used by 
insider traders when trading on the option market and future research in this area is 
required to supplement the results of this thesis. 
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10. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 – Columns of the original dataset 
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 Identifier Price Age 
SEC Reference Number Volume State 
Date of earliest release Contract size Address 
Court Expiry Salary 
Individual Strike Price Disgorgement 
Corporation In/At/Out of the Money Tippee disgorgement 
Bloomberg Code Proceeds of Trade Prejudgement interest 
Broker Profit Civil penalty 
Exchange Individual or group 
trades 
Criminal fines 
Ticker Announcement Date Penalty 
Instrument Information Type Jail term 
Buy/sell People prosecuted no. Prior convictions 
Date of Trade 1 No. of ring members Short description 
Date of Trade 2 Degrees Separation Reference cases 
Time Total no. of people trading  
Total Value of Trade Occupation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 - Regression 1 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liqudity, Prior_Liqudity, Multiple_Days, Information_Type, 
Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, Change, Insider_Wide and Relationships. There were 
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 91 observations used in the regression. Given that there was inconsistency problems with 7 
observations whose Insider Volume exceeded the Day Liquidity, we have deleted these observations in 
this regression. A further 10 observations were lost from inclusion of the Insider_Wide variable. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                   11       96.05760        8.73251       5.61    <.0001 
Error                   79      123.08006        1.55798 
Corrected Total         90      219.13766 
 
 
Root MSE              1.24819    R‐Square     0.4383 
Dependent Mean        4.72235    Adj R‐Sq     0.3601 
Coeff Var            26.43154 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept              1      3.44687      1.82265     1.89**  0.0623 
Days                   1      0.07219      0.17120     0.42    0.6744 
Profit_Option          1      0.17452      0.17099     1.02    0.3105 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.59099      0.11985     4.93*** <.0001 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.29438      0.12602    ‐2.34*** 0.0220 
Multiple_Days          1      0.74347      0.35978     2.07*** 0.0421 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.23570      0.34949    ‐0.67    0.5020 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.02999      0.89646    ‐2.26*** 0.0263 
Underlying_Vol         1     ‐0.02668      0.16228    ‐0.16    0.8698 
Change                 1      0.54528      0.33797     1.61*   0.1106 
Insider_Wide           1      0.12402      0.32025     0.39    0.6996 
Relationships          1     ‐0.03737      0.16673    ‐0.22    0.8232 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 - Regression 2 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liqudity, Prior_Liqudity, Multiple_Days, Information_Type, 
Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, Change and Relationships. There were 101 
observations used in the regression. Given that there was inconsistency problems with 7 observations 
whose Insider Volume exceeded the Day Liquidity, we have deleted these observations in this 
regression. By removing the insignificant Insider_Wide variable from previous regressions, this 
allowed the Day_Liqudity variable to be explored with 101 observations (minus the 7 inconsistent 
observations). Given the deleted observations have high Volume relative to the Day_Liqudity, their 
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 deletion could lead to censorship bias, and the extent of this bias is explored in the following 
regressions. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                   10      108.64575       10.86458       7.14    <.0001 
Error                   90      136.85959        1.52066 
Corrected Total        100      245.50534 
 
 
Root MSE              1.23315    R‐Square     0.4425 
Dependent Mean        4.64506    Adj R‐Sq     0.3806 
Coeff Var            26.54761 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      3.66878      1.62583     2.26*** 0.0265 
Days                   1      0.03357      0.15687     0.21    0.8310 
Profit_Option          1      0.16433      0.15919     1.03    0.3047 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.53499      0.11047     4.84*** <.0001 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.27208      0.11518    ‐2.36*** 0.0203 
Multiple_Days          1      0.83880      0.31916     2.63*** 0.0101 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.27500      0.31897    ‐0.86    0.3909 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.00949      0.79323    ‐2.53*** 0.0130 
Underlying_Vol         1     ‐0.02359      0.13812    ‐0.17    0.8648 
Change                 1      0.51296      0.31690     1.62**  0.1090 
Relationships          1     ‐0.06176      0.14866    ‐0.42    0.6788 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 - Regression 3 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liqudity, Prior_Liqudity, Multiple_Days, Information_Type, 
Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, Change, Insider_Wide and Relationships. There were 
95 observations used in the regression. Given that there were inconsistency problems with 7 
observations whose Insider Volume exceeded the Day Liquidity, we have preserved these observations 
by adjusting the Values of the Volume of those 7 variables from ‘Volume’ to ‘Volume + 
Day_Liquidity’ to correct the potential errors in the TaqTic database. This allowed the Day_Liqudity 
variable to be explored with the additional observations. Given the estimation work is uncertain, it is 
acknowledged that these results have potential measurement error; however it is estimated to be fairly 
low. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
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                                    Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                   11      109.81253        9.98296       6.25    <.0001 
Error                   83      132.60188        1.59761 
Corrected Total         94      242.41442 
 
 
Root MSE              1.26397    R‐Square     0.4530 
Dependent Mean        4.82414    Adj R‐Sq     0.3805 
Coeff Var            26.20088 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept              1      3.03298      1.76993     1.71**  0.0903 
Days                   1      0.04981      0.17107     0.29    0.7716 
Profit_Option          1      0.15099      0.16870     0.90    0.3734 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.65906      0.11539     5.71*** <.0001 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.40853      0.11759    ‐3.47*** 0.0008 
Multiple_Days          1      0.51504      0.34800     1.48*   0.1427 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.02562      0.33962    ‐0.08    0.9401 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐1.75783      0.87370    ‐2.01*** 0.0475 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.04372      0.15779     0.28    0.7824 
Change                 1      0.59120      0.33583     1.76**  0.0820 
Insider_Wide           1      0.13981      0.31701     0.44    0.6603 
Relationships          1     ‐0.04309      0.16787    ‐0.26    0.7981 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 - Regression 4 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liqudity, Prior_Liqudity, Multiple_Days, Information_Type, 
Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, Change and Relationships. All 108 observations in the 
polished dataset were used in the regression. Given that there were inconsistency problems with 7 
observations whose Insider Volume exceeded the Day Liquidity, we have preserved these observations 
by adjusting the Values of the Volume of those 7 variables from ‘Volume’ to ‘Volume + 
Day_Liquidity’ to correct the potential errors in the TaqTic database. By also removing the 
insignificant Insider_Wide variable from previous regressions, this allowed the Day_Liqudity variable 
to be explored with all 108 observations. Given the estimation work is uncertain, it is acknowledge that 
these results have potential measurement error, however it is estimated to be fairly low. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                   10      140.20829       14.02083       8.90    <.0001 
Error                   97      152.73492        1.57459 
Corrected Total        107      292.94321 
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Root MSE              1.25483    R‐Square     0.4786 
Dependent Mean        4.81116    Adj R‐Sq     0.4249 
Coeff Var            26.08156 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept              1      2.84083      1.55172     1.83**  0.0702 
Days                   1      0.03535      0.15578     0.23    0.8210 
Profit_Option          1      0.19741      0.14963     1.32    0.1902 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.63434      0.10624     5.97*** <.0001 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.42519      0.10587    ‐4.02*** 0.0001 
Multiple_Days          1      0.59722      0.31099     1.92**  0.0577 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.12937      0.31265    ‐0.41    0.6799 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐1.97050      0.76229    ‐2.58*** 0.0112 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.08484      0.13130     0.65    0.5197 
Change                 1      0.54082      0.31578     1.71**  0.0900 
Relationships          1     ‐0.04495      0.14863    ‐0.30    0.7630 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 - Regression 5 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Prior_Liqudity, Multiple_Days, Information_Type, Underlying_Performance, 
Underlying_Volume, Change and Relationships. All 108 observations in the polished dataset were used 
in the regression. Removing the Day_Liquidity variable rectifies two issues. Given that there were 
inconsistency problems with 7 observations whose Insider Volume exceeded the Day Liquidity, we 
have preserved these observations by removing the Day_Liquidity variable in the following regression 
along with the Insider_Wide variable. This removal is an alternate solution to leaving the Day_liquidity 
variable and rectifying the potential source of error possibly leading to measurement error if incorrectly 
done. The removal of Day_Liqudity also mitigates the spurious regression and over-fitting since insider 
volumes being a large proportion of Day_liquidty are naturally highly correlated with Day_liqudity. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       84.07639        9.34182       4.38    <.0001 
Error                   98      208.86682        2.13129 
Corrected Total        107      292.94321 
 
 
Root MSE              1.45990    R‐Square     0.2870 
Dependent Mean        4.81116    Adj R‐Sq     0.2215 
Coeff Var            30.34394 
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Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      2.35416      1.80282     1.31    0.1947 
Days                   1     ‐0.11361      0.17890    ‐0.64    0.5269 
Profit_Option          1      0.24116      0.17387     1.39    0.1686 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.16276      0.11205    ‐1.45*   0.1496 
Multiple_Days          1      1.16943      0.34421     3.40*** 0.0010 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.36205      0.36091    ‐1.00    0.3182 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.41246      0.88267    ‐2.73*** 0.0074 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.25881      0.14895     1.74**  0.0854 
Change                 1      0.71024      0.36590     1.94**  0.0551 
Relationships          1     ‐0.14752      0.17177    ‐0.86    0.3925 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 - Robustness Test 1 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trade does not break 
up their trades. The addition of the Insider_trade dummy variable shows the additional trading of the 
inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9      106.58653       11.84295      10.28    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      251.76473 
 
   
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.4234 
Dependent Mean        3.66396    Adj R‐Sq     0.3822 
Coeff Var            29.29643 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      1.68326      1.18648     1.42    0.1585 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
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 Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1      1.83632      0.31622     5.81*** <.0001 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 - Robustness Test 2 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trader breaks up their 
trades into 2 trading parcels. The addition of the Insider_trade dummy variable shows the additional 
trading of the inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       63.26152        7.02906       6.10    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      208.43973 
 
 
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.3035 
Dependent Mean        4.01053    Adj R‐Sq     0.2538 
Coeff Var            26.76476 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      2.37641      1.18648     2.00*** 0.0473 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1      1.14318      0.31622     3.62*** 0.0004 
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 Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 - Robustness Test 3 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trader breaks up their 
trades into 3 trading parcels. The addition of the Insider_trade dummy variable shows the additional 
trading of the inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       53.06328        5.89592       5.12    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      198.24149 
 
 
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.2677 
Dependent Mean        4.21327    Adj R‐Sq     0.2154 
Coeff Var            25.47690 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      2.78187      1.18648     2.34*** 0.0206 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1      0.73771      0.31622     2.33*** 0.0212 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
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Appendix 10 - Robustness Test 4 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trader breaks up their 
trades into 4 trading parcels. The addition of the Insider_trade dummy variable shows the additional 
trading of the inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       52.60732        5.84526       5.07    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      197.78553 
 
 
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.2660 
Dependent Mean        4.35711    Adj R‐Sq     0.2136 
Coeff Var            24.63583 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      3.06955      1.18648     2.59*** 0.0108 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1      0.45003      0.31622     1.42    0.1572 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
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Appendix 11 - Robustness Test 5 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trader breaks up their 
trades into 5 trading parcels. The addition of the Insider_trade dummy variable shows the additional 
trading of the inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       56.12923        6.23658       5.41    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      201.30743 
 
 
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.2788 
Dependent Mean        4.46868    Adj R‐Sq     0.2273 
Coeff Var            24.02074 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      3.29270      1.18648     2.78*** 0.0064 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1      0.22689      0.31622     0.72    0.4744 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
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Appendix 12 - Robustness Test 6 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trader breaks up their 
trades into 6 trading parcels. The addition of the Insider_trade dummy variable shows the additional 
trading of the inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       61.52028        6.83559       5.93    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      206.69848 
 
 
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.2976 
Dependent Mean        4.55984    Adj R‐Sq     0.2475 
Coeff Var            23.54051 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      3.47502      1.18648     2.93*** 0.0040 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1      0.04456      0.31622     0.14    0.8882 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 13 - Robustness Test 7 
 
The following is the raw output from SAS 9.1 of the regression of Volume against Days, 
Profit_Option, Day_Liquidity, Prior_Liqudity, Underlying_Performance, Underlying_Volume, 
Change, Information_Type and Relationships. The 136 observations, which include the 68 single 
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trading observations from the original 108 observation dataset and the 68 artificial matched samples as 
a control. The artificial matched samples in this scenario assume that the average trader breaks up their 
trades into 7 trading parcels. The addition of the Insider_Trade dummy variable shows the additional 
trading of the inside trader over the average trade. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of           Mean 
Source                  DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                    9       67.84185        7.53798       6.54    <.0001 
Error                  126      145.17820        1.15221 
Corrected Total        135      213.02005 
 
 
Root MSE              1.07341    R‐Square     0.3185 
Dependent Mean        4.63691    Adj R‐Sq     0.2698 
Coeff Var            23.14922 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Label                 DF     Estimate        Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 
Intercept              1      3.62917      1.18648     3.06*** 0.0027 
Days                   1      0.07626      0.11219     0.68    0.4980 
Profit_Option          1      0.07334      0.18863     0.39    0.6981 
Day_Liquidity          1      0.28932      0.08431     3.43*** 0.0008 
Prior_Liquidity        1     ‐0.07770      0.08972    ‐0.87    0.3881 
Underlying_Per         1     ‐2.78506      0.87533    ‐3.18*** 0.0018 
Underlying_Vol         1      0.01727      0.10913     0.16    0.8745 
Change                 1     ‐0.10721      0.23579    ‐0.45    0.6501 
Insider_Trade          1     ‐0.10959      0.31622    ‐0.35    0.7295 
Information_Type       1     ‐0.11911      0.23586    ‐0.51    0.6144 
***denotes significance at the 0.05% level 
**denotes significance at the 0.1% level 
*denotes significance at the 0.15% level 
 
 
